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This paper studies the barriers to the diﬀusion of development across countries from a long-
term perspective. We ﬁnd that genetic distance, a measure associated with the amount of
time elapsed since two populations’ last common ancestors, bears a statistically and economi-
cally signiﬁcant relationship with pairwise income diﬀerences, even when controlling for various
other measures of geographical, climatic, cultural and historical diﬀerences. We provide an
economic interpretation of these ﬁndings, within a framework in which (a) genetic distance
captures divergence in characteristics, including cultural traits, that are transmitted vertically
across generations within populations over the long term, and (b) such diﬀerences in vertically-
transmitted characteristics act as barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations from the
world technological frontier. The empirical evidence over time and space is consistent with this
barriers interpretation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
What explains the vast diﬀerences in income per capita that are observed across countries? In this
paper, we argue that barriers to the diﬀusion of development prevent poor countries from adopting
economic practices, institutions and technologies that make countries rich.1 We argue that these
barriers are not only geographic, but also human. We propose a way to measure overall diﬀerences
in human characteristics that have been transmitted with variations across generations over the
very long run, including culturally-transmitted traits, using genetic distance. We then test the
hypothesis that these long-term diﬀerences have created barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations
from the world technological frontier in modern times.2
At the center of our analysis is an important measure of distance between populations: genetic
distance. For the ﬁrst time, we document and discuss the relationship between genetic distance
and diﬀerences in income per capita across countries. We ﬁnd that measures of genetic distance
have a statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀect on diﬀerences in income per capita, even
when controlling for various measures of geographical isolation, and measures of cultural, climatic
and historical diﬀerences. The eﬀect of genetic distance holds not only for contemporary income
diﬀerences, but also for income diﬀerences measured since 1500. Moreover, the eﬀect of genetic
distance holds not only for contemporary and historical worldwide income diﬀerences, but also for
income diﬀerences within Europe. In fact, the magnitude of the eﬀect of genetic distance is larger
for a sample of European countries than across countries from all continents.
These empirical ﬁndings motivate two key questions: 1) What does genetic distance between
human populations actually measure, and 2) Why is genetic distance positively correlated with
1Recent contributions to the literature on the determinants of income per capita using cross-country regressions
include Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003), Alcalá and
Ciccone (2004), Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004), among many others.
2There is a voluminous literature on cross-country income convergence, dating back to Baumol (1986). In the
neoclassical literature, convergence occurs because the marginal return to capital is higher in countries farther from
their steady state, which depends, among other things, on the level of technology. In contrast, we seek to shed light
on the factors that prevent or facilitate the diﬀusion of productivity-enhancing innovations across countries. In this
respect, our paper is closer to the approach in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), where technological diﬀusion drives
convergence. Policy-induced constraints on the diﬀusion of technology are analyzed by Parente and Prescott (1994,
2002). Policy experimentation and imitation across neighbors are studied by Mukand and Rodrik (2005). Unlike
these contributions, we consider more broadly the barriers to the diﬀusion of economic development from a very
long-term perspective.
1economic distance? In this paper we provide an economic model of technological and institutional
diﬀusion to shed light on these questions.
Measures of genetic distance between populations are based on aggregated diﬀerences in allele
frequencies for various loci on a chromosome. We use measures of FST distance, also known as
coancestor coeﬃcients.3 S i n c em o s tg e n e t i cd i ﬀerences tend to accumulate at a regular pace over
time, as in a kind of molecular clock, genetic distance is closely linked to the time elapsed since
two populations’ last common ancestors (that is, the time since the two populations were in fact
the same population), and can be used to determine paths of genealogical relatedness of diﬀerent
populations over time. On average, populations that are more genetically distant have had more
time to diverge in a broad variety of characteristics transmitted intergenerationally. These include
characteristics that are passed on through DNA, but also traits that are passed on not through
biological reproduction but through cultural transmission.4 As long as these cultural characteristics
are transmitted to younger generations from genetically related individuals within their population,
they will be correlated with genetic distance.
Therefore, one should not view genetic distance as an exclusive measure of distance in DNA-
transmitted characteristics, and should not assume that the mechanisms linking genetic distance
to economic distance are necessarily genetic.5 It is more appropriate to interpret genetic distance
as a general metric for genealogical distance between populations, capturing overall diﬀerences not
only in genetically transmitted features but also in culturally transmitted human characteristics.
The literature on cultural transmission and evolution distinguishes between vertical transmission
3Our main source for genetic distances between human populations is Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza (1994).
Recent textbook references on human evolution are Boyd and Silk (2003) and Jobling, Hurles and Tyler-Smith (2004).
For a nontechnical discussion of these concepts see Dawkins (2004).
4Evolutionary models of cultural transmission have been developed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and
Boyd and Richerson (1985). For a nontechnical discussion see Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995, chapter 8).
Economic models of cultural transmission from parents to children have been provided by Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001). Galor and Moav (2003) present an innovative theory of long-term economic growth in which a key role is
played by evolutionary changes in preference parameters that are genetically transmitted across generations (see also
Galor, 2005).
5Some of our empirical results, especially from European data, suggest a substantial role for cultural rather
than biological transmission. Moreover, as we discuss in Section 2, any sharp distinction between genetic and cultural
characteristics may be misleading, since the economic impact of genetic and cultural characteristics is likely to depend
on their combination and interaction.
2(across diﬀerent generations within the same group) and horizontal transmission (within the same
generation, across possibly unrelated groups).6 We deﬁne as "vertically-transmitted characteris-
tics" (or vertical characteristics, for short) all traits passed across generations within populations,
whether genetically or culturally. If we take this broader perspective, we can interpret the eﬀect of
genetic distance on income diﬀerences as evidence of an important role for vertical characteristics
transmitted with variations across generations over the very long run.
How do these long-term vertical characteristics aﬀect current income diﬀerences? What are
the economic mechanisms that link genetic distance to economic distance? Our key hypothesis is
that diﬀerences in vertical characteristics act as barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations
from the world technological frontier. The idea is quite intuitive: societies that are more similar to
the innovator in terms of vertically-transmitted habits, customs and other traits face lower current
costs to imitate and adapt productivity-enhancing innovations. In contrast, societies that are
historically more distant face higher imitation costs, stemming from a variety of possible obstacles
to communication and adaptation (diﬀerent rules and conventions, diﬀerent norms and values, etc.).
If this hypothesis is correct, the relevant measure of genetic distance associated with economic
distance between two societies should not be the absolute pairwise genetic distance between the
two societies, but their relative distance from the world technological frontier. In our empirical
analysis we test this central implication using the United States as the world technological frontier
in modern times. Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of relative genetic distance
on economic distance is (a) positive, and (b) larger than the eﬀect of absolute genetic distance, an
imperfect proxy for the relative genetic distance from the frontier.
The variation over time of the eﬀe c to fg e n e t i cd i s t a n c eo ni n c o m ed i ﬀerences provides additional
important clues about the economic mechanisms underlying our results. The eﬀect, while always
large, positive and signiﬁcant, has varied in magnitude since 1500 in interesting ways. The eﬀect
slightly declined from 1500 to 1820, spiked up and peaked in 1870, and steadily declined again
afterwards. This is consistent with the interpretation of genetic distance as related to barriers
to the diﬀusion of technological and institutional changes from the world technological frontier.
The eﬀect of barriers should increase right after a major improvement in the technology for the
production of innovations and imitation (namely, the introduction of modern R&D at the onset of
6See Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Shennan, 2004. We will discuss this terminology
in more detail in Section 3.
3the Industrial Revolution), when only the innovator and its closest followers have adopted the new
R&D technology. We show theoretically that the eﬀect should eventually peak and then decline
over time, as the regime change in R&D gradually spreads to more distant populations, improving
their ability to imitate the continuous ﬂow of innovations from the frontier Eventually, the eﬀect
of genetic distance on income diﬀerences returns to its long-term (positive) level. In summary,
the pattern of the eﬀect of genetic distance over time and space is consistent with our theoretical
model: genetic distance captures long-term diﬀerences in vertically-transmitted characteristics that
constitute barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations from the world technological frontier.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical framework in which genetic
distance captures divergence in characteristics that are transmitted vertically across generations
within populations over the long run, and those diﬀerences act as barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion
of innovations from the world technological frontier. In Section 3, we discuss our data on genetic
distance and what it measures. In Section 4 we test the predictions of our theoretical model.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Long-Term Diﬀusion of Development
In this section we argue that diﬀerences in vertically transmitted characteristics create barriers to
the long-term diﬀusion of development. We present a theoretical framework linking genetic distance,
vertical characteristics, and the horizontal diﬀusion of economic development from the technological
frontier. This section has three parts. First, we illustrate our key ideas within a stylized setting.
Second, we present a microfounded dynamic model of innovation and technological diﬀusion that
conﬁrms the basic insights from the simpliﬁed model, and generates additional testable implications.
Third, we brieﬂy provide a general discussion of the diﬀerent possible channels linking genealogical
relatedness and economic outcomes. The analytical framework presented in this section leads to
testable predictions about the relationship between measures of genetic distance and diﬀerences in
income per capita across time and space.
2.1 The Basic Ideas
Genetic distance between populations captures the degree of genealogical relatedness of diﬀerent
populations over time. Therefore, genetic distance can be interpreted as a general metric for average
diﬀerences in vertical characteristics. Typically, such characteristics include not only features that
4are directly transmitted from parents to children via DNA, but also traits that are culturally
transmitted across generations within a population (customs, habits, etc.). In fact, it has been
noted that "the measured heritability between parents and oﬀspring is as great for traits passed
on culturally as for those passed on genetically by biological reproduction" (Shennan, 2002, p.
43; see also Boyd and Richerson, 1985, p. 55).7 In this paper we deﬁne vertically transmitted
characteristics (or vertical characteristics) as the set of characteristics passed on across generations
within a population, biologically and/or culturally, over the very long run - i.e., over the time
horizon along which populations have phylogenetically diverged (thousands or tens of thousands of
years).8 Thus, the ﬁrst step of our analytical framework is based on the following key idea:
Hypothesis 1. Genetic distance between populations measures their average distance in the
overall set of characteristics that are vertically transmitted across generations in the very long run.
As already mentioned, the term "vertical" is borrowed from the evolutionary literature on cul-
tural transmission (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Shennan, 2002;
Richerson and Boyd, 2004). This literature distinguishes between vertical transmission (across
diﬀerent generations within the same group) and horizontal transmission (within the same gen-
eration, possibly across diﬀerent groups). Our central hypothesis is that vertical and horizontal
transmission are closely linked:
Hypothesis 2 Distance in vertical characteristics acts as a barrier to the horizontal diﬀusion
of innovations.
In other words we assume that populations that share a more recent common history, and
are therefore closer in terms of vertically transmitted characteristics (habits, customs, etc.), face
lower costs and obstacles to adopt each other’s innovations. In particular, we are interested in the
horizontal diﬀusion of economic development in historical times, and especially after the Industrial
7It is important to stress that such vertical transmission takes place across generations within a given population,
and that "oblique" transmission from other genetically-related people within the group is also part of our deﬁnition.
Hence "vertical" in our context is not limited to parent-to-child transmission stricto sensu, but has a broader meaning.
This broader connotation is slightly diﬀerent from the use of the term often found in the anthropological literature
and related ﬁelds. We thank Robert Boyd for pointing this out to us.
8The central importance of vertical transmission of cultural characteristics to account for diﬀerences among soci-
eties has been well documented in cross-cultural studies. For example, Guglielmino et al. (1995) show that vertical
transmission has a paramount role in accounting for variation of cultural traits in a group of African societies. See
also Shennan (2002, chapter 3).
5Revolution. Thus, we will focus on diﬀerences in vertical characteristics as barriers to the diﬀusion
of innovations from the modern technological frontier.9
A highly stylized model can illustrate our key ideas in the simplest possible way. Consider three
periods (o for "origin," p for "prehistory," and h for "history"). In period o there exists only one
population (population 0). In period p the original population splits in two populations (population
1 and population 2). In period h each of the two populations split in two separate populations
again (population 1 into populations 1.1 and 1.2, and population 2 into populations 2.1 and 2.2),
as in Figure 1. In this setting the genetic distance dg(i,j) between population i and population j
can be simply measured by the number of periods since they were one population:
dg(1.1,1.2) = dg(2.1,2.2) = 1 (1)
and:
dg(1.1 , 2.1) = dg(1.1 , 2.2) = dg(1.2 , 2.1) = dg(1.2 , 2.2) = 2 (2)
Figure 1 - Population Tree
9World technological leadership since the British Industrial Revolution (1700s) has been predominantly associated
with Britain and, by the late 1800s, the United States (Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon, 1993). In the years before
the Industrial Revolution, the technological frontier was probably held by the the Dutch. According to Maddison
(2003), in previous times the regions with the highest levels of income per capita were in Italy (around 1500) and
China (around 1000). We will return to this issue in Section 4.
6For simplicity, we summarize all vertical characteristics of a population as a point on the real
line That is, we say that a population i has vertical characteristics vi,w h e r evi is a real number.
These characteristics are transmitted vertically, with variations, over the long run (i.e., from one
period to the next). Hence, populations inherit characteristics from their ancestor populations with
changes. For example, in period p population 1 will have characteristics given by:
v1 = v0 + η1 (3)
where v0 are the characteristics inherited from the previous generations, while η1 denotes the change
that has taken place between period o and period p. In general, a population i0 descending from a
population i will have characteristics:
vi0 = vi + ηi0 (4)
In this analysis we are going to focus on the simplest possible mechanism for variation: vertical
change as a random walk. In particular, we assume that for every population i0, ηi0 takes value
η>0 with probability 1/2 and −η with probability 1/2. That is, we model changes in vertically
transmitted characteristics as neutral and due to random drift. This view is consistent with the
interpretation of genetic distance itself as a molecular clock. While one could consider more complex
processes, this formalization has two inherent advantages: (a) it is simple ("Occam’s razor"), and
(b) it allows us to illustrate how neutral random changes can be suﬃcient to generate our theoretical
predictions.10
When vertical transmission follows the above process, the distance in vertical characteristics
between two populations dv(i,j) ≡ |vj−vi| is on average increasing in their genetic distance dg(i,j).
Speciﬁcally, in period h the expected diﬀerence in vertical characteristics between populations at a
genetic distance equal to 2 and populations at a genetic distance equal to 1 is given by:




This is not a deterministic relationship. In principle, it is possible that two populations that
are genealogically more distant may end up with more similar vertical characteristics than two
populations that are more closely related. But that outcome is less likely to be observed than
the opposite. On average, genetic distance and distance in vertically-transmitted characteristics go
hand in hand. This is a speciﬁc illustration of our general Hypothesis 1.
10In Subsection 2.3 we will return to this issue more generally.
7Our main idea (Hypothesis 2) can also be illustrated within this highly simpliﬁed setting.
Assume that in periods o and p all populations produce output using the basic technology Y =
A0L, so that all populations have the same income per capita y0 = A0.I np e r i o dh a population
happens to ﬁnd a more productive technology A1 = A0+∆ where ∆ > 0.11 Denote this population
at the technological frontier with f. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we assume that populations
that are farther from population f in terms of vertical characteristics face higher barriers to adopt
the new technology. To ﬁx ideas, assume that a society i at a vertical distance from the frontier
equal to dv(i,f) can improve its technology only by:
∆i =[ 1− βdv(i,f)]∆ (6)
where the parameter β>0 captures the barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations due to
distance in vertical characteristics.12 Hence, income per capita in society i is given by:
yi = A0 +[ 1− βdv(i,f)]∆ (7)
This immediately implies that the economic distance between population i and population j,m e a -
s u r e db yt h e i ri n c o m ed i ﬀerence de(i,j) ≡ |yi − yj|, is a function of their relative vertical distance
from the frontier |dv(i,f) − dv(j,f)|:
de(i,j) ≡ |yj − yi| = β∆|dv(i,f) − dv(j,f)| (8)
As we have shown, vertical diﬀerence dv(i,j) and genetic distance dg(i,j) go hand in hand on
average. Therefore, the above relationship implies that, on average, the income diﬀerence across
societies is increasing in their relative genetic distance from the frontier society. Formally, we have:
E{de(i,j)||dg(i,f) − dg(j,f)| =2 } −




This result is intuitive. As we increase relative genetic distance from the frontier, the expected
income gap increases. The size of the eﬀect is a function of the extent of divergence in vertically
11We abstract from the possibility that the likelihood of ﬁnding the innovation may itself be a function of a society’s
vertical characteristics. Such direct eﬀects of vertical characteristics strengthen the links between genetic distance
and economic outcomes, but are not necessary for our results.
12Without loss of generality, we assume that β is lower than 1/2. Alternatively, the formula could be re-written as
∆i =m a x {[1 − βdv(i,f)]∆,0}
8transmitted characteristics (η) as societies follow separate paths over time, the extent to which this
divergence in vertical characteristics constitutes a barrier to the horizontal diﬀusion of productivity-
enhancing innovations (β), and the size of the improvement in productivity at the frontier (∆).
Our framework predicts a positive correlation between economic distance |yj − yi| and relative
genetic distance from the frontier |dg(i,f)−dg(j,f)|. It can also account for a positive correlation
between economic distance and simple genetic distance dg(i,j) as long as |dg(i,f) − dg(j,f)| and
dg(i,j) are positively correlated. In fact, it is easy to verify that the two measures are positively
correlated in our theoretical framework. More importantly, as we will see in Section 4, relative
genetic distance from the frontier and simple genetic distance are also positively correlated in
the actual data. Our framework then provides an economic explanation for the observed positive
correlation between economic distance and genetic distance. At the same time, our theory predicts
that relative genetic distance from the frontier should have a stronger impact on economic distance
than simple genetic distance, because it is a more accurate proxy for the true variable (relative
distance from the frontier in terms of vertically transmitted characteristics). This point can be
illustrated within our stylized framework. For example, the expected economic distance associated
with an absolute genetic distance dg(i,j)=1in our model is
E{de(i,j)|dg(i,j)=1 } = ηβ∆ (10)
while the expected economic distance associated with an equivalent level of relative genetic distance
|dg(i,f) − dg(j,f)| =1is higher:13
E{de(i,j)||dg(i,f) − dg(j,f)| =1 } =
7ηβ∆
6
>E {de(i,j)||dg(i,j)=1 } (11)
In summary, our theory has the following testable implications:
Implication 1. Relative genetic distance from the frontier is positively correlated with economic
distance.
and:
Implication 2. The eﬀect on economic distance associated with relative genetic distance from
the frontier is larger than the eﬀect associated with absolute genetic distance.
In Section 4 we will test these two implications empirically. Before we go to the data, we
are going to extend our theoretical analysis in order to provide a formalization of the diﬀusion of
innovations within a microfounded setup, yielding additional testable implications.
13An analogous relationship exists between E{de(i,j) || dg(i,f) − dg(j,f)| =2 } and E{de(i,j) || dg(i,j)=2 }.
92.2 A Model of the Historical Period
A b o v ew eh a v ep r e s e n t e dah i g h l ys t y l i z e dm o d e li nw h i c ht h eh o r i z o n t a ld i ﬀusion of modern
development has been collapsed into one big exogenous innovation of size ∆. In this subsection we
will extend our analysis to a dynamic setting in which the processes of innovation and imitation are
endogenous and take place over time. The purpose of this analysis is to illustrate our hypotheses
within a model that builds on the existing literature on the endogenous diﬀusion of technology.
Speciﬁcally, we build closely on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997 and 2003, chapter 8), with the
additional assumption that imitation costs are a function of distance in vertical characteristics
between the imitating society and the technological leader. Our analysis will now be focused
on the more recent historical period in which horizontal diﬀusion of modern development takes
place, rather than on the very long term in which populations split and vertical characteristics
(slowly) change over time. Therefore, for simplicity, we will now abstract from long-term changes
in populations and vertical characteristics, and assume a constant number of societies with given
vertical characteristics.14
Consider a world in which each society i (i =1 ,2,...M) is inhabited by a population of size
Li =1with vertical characteristics vi,w h e r evi is a point on the real line, and dv(i,j) ≡ |vi − vj|
is the distance between society i and society j in the space of vertical characteristics. Time t is





under a standard budget constraint, where Ci(t) is consumption, and ρ>0 is the subjective





= ri(t) − ρ (13)
where ri(t) is the real interest rate in society i ( w ea s s u m et h a tt h eM societies are not ﬁnancially
integrated). At time t,i ne a c hs o c i e t yi, there is a continuum of intermediate goods, measured on
the interval [0,A i(t)]. Each intermediate good is produced by a local monopolist. In each society i




[Xki(t)]αdk, 0 <α<1 (14)
14In other words, the implicit assumption, quite realistically, is that convergence to the economic steady state takes
place faster than the long-term process of population splits and vertical cultural change. An extension of this model
of diﬀusion to allow for changes in vertical characteristics over time is left for further research.
10where Xki(t) is the quantity of intermediate good of type k employed at time t in economy i.W e
assume that at time t0 society f is at the technological frontier, which means that Af(t0) >A i(t0)
for all i 6= f. Innovation at the frontier economy takes place endogenously, as in Romer (1990) and
related literature.15 In particular, as in Barro and Sala—i-Martin (1997 and 2003, chapters 6 and
8), we assume that the inventor of intermediate good k retains perpetual monopoly power over the
production of that input in society f, and henceforth sells it at price Pk =1 /α, earning the proﬁt
ﬂow π =( 1− α)α(1+α)/(1−α) at each time t.16 T h ec o s to fi n v e n t i n gan e wi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o da t
the frontier is λ units of ﬁnal output. Free entry into the innovation sector implies that the real
interest rate rf(t) must be equal to π/λ.W e a s s u m e π/λ > ρ, which implies that consumption





Consequently, output Yf(t) and the frontier level of intermediate goods Af(t) will also grow at the
rate g.
The other societies cannot use the intermediate goods invented in economy f directly, but, as in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), must pay an imitation cost μi in order to adapt the intermediate
goods to local conditions. Our key assumption is that such imitation costs are increasing in the
distance in vertically characteristics between the imitator and the frontier.S p e c i ﬁcally, we assume







The above speciﬁcation is consistent with Hypothesis 2: diﬀerences in vertical characteristics in-
crease the costs of horizontal imitation. The parameter θ captures the extent to which dissimilarity
in vertical characteristics increases imitation costs.17 For a given distance in vertical characteristics,
an imitator in society i faces lower imitation costs when there is a larger set of intermediate goods
available for imitation (that is, when Ai(t)/Af(t) is low). The rationale for this assumption is that
the intermediate goods that are easier to imitate are copied ﬁrst. The parameter ψ>0 captures
this advantage from technological backwardness.18
15Textbook surveys of this literature are provided by Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2003).
16For a detailed derivation see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997 and 2003)
17The parameter θ plays a function analogous to β in the framework of Subsection 2.1.
18Whether imitators whose technology is farther from the technological frontier face lower or higher imitation costs
11Again, we assume that an imitator who pays cost μi(t) to imitate good k has perpetual monopoly
power over the production of that input in economy i, and hence can charge Pk =1 /α, earning the
proﬁt ﬂow π =( 1− α)α(1+α)/(1−α), while output is proportional to available intermediate goods
Ai(t) in equilibrium:
Yi(t)=α2α/(1−α)Ai(t) (17)
As shown in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997, 2003), with free entry into the "imitation" sector,










2.2.1 Economic distance in steady state
In steady state, the level of imitation costs μ∗
i is constant, while the number of intermediate goods
in economy i, as well as output and consumption, all grow at the same rate as in economy f -t h a t
is, at rate g =
π
λ








for all i and j, which implies the following relationship in steady state:
lnY ∗






[dv(i,f) − dv(j,f)] (20)
The intuition of the above equation is straightforward: long-term diﬀerences in output between
societies is an increasing function of their relative cost to imitate, which depends on their relative
distance from the frontier in terms of vertical characteristics.19 Therefore, this microfounded dy-
namic model of horizontal diﬀusion conﬁrms the key implications of the simpliﬁed reduced-form
setup presented in Subsection 2.1.
is debated in the empirical literature (for a recent survey, see Fagerberg, 2004). Our perspective suggests that, when
assessing the relationship between imitation costs and technological backwardness empirically, one should control for
distance in long-term vertical characteristics. As we will see, in steady state societies that are farther technologically
(and hence should face lower imitation costs for this reason) are also farther in terms of vertical distance from the
frontier (and hence should face higher imitation costs through this channel). Hence, failure to account for this vertical
distance from the frontier may lead to overestimate the imitation costs directly associated with a given technology
gap - that is, to underestimate the advantages directly associated with technological backwardness (i.e., with a lower
Ai(t)/Af(t) in our framework).
19Interestingly, the eﬀect of relative genetic distance from the frontier is decreasing in parameter ψ, which measures
the beneﬁts (lower imitation costs) associated with technological backwardness.
122.2.2 Regime Change in R&D Technology
The above analysis has been developed for a given innovation and imitation technology (for a
given parameter λ, in our setting). However, one can argue that the past two centuries have
witnessed a major regime change in the very mechanisms through which societies improve their
technologies over time. Alfred North Whitehead (1925, chapter 6) famously said that "the greatest
invention of the 19th century was the invention of the method of invention".20 In our framework,
we can formalize this major regime change as a one-shot change in R&D technology at the frontier
(say, a dramatic reduction in λ at the frontier at the onset of the Industrial Revolution). Since
followers’ R&D activities are focused on imitation, better R&D methods, if successfully adapted,
may allow a reduction in imitation costs. But there is no reason why that adjustment should
happen instantaneously. In fact, one should expect that a major change in R&D technology at the
f r o n t i e rm a ys p r e a do n l ys l o w l yt ot h ei m i t a t i o ntechnology at the periphery. This motivates the
important question: "How does the change in R&D technology itself spread to imitating societies?"
Consistent with our general approach - and, in particular, with Hypothesis 2 - we should expect
that followers that are closer to the frontier society in terms of long-term vertical characteristics
would also be in a better position to adopt those improvements in R&D technology, and hence would
be able to reduce their imitation costs at an earlier date. In what follows, we will model these ideas
within our simpliﬁed framework - namely, we will study the transitional dynamics associated with a
shock to R&D technology at the frontier, and the gradual diﬀusion of the improvement to imitation
technologies at the periphery.
Let λf(t) d e n o t et h ec o s to fi n v e n t i n gan e wi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o da tt h ef r o n t i e ra tt i m et,w h i l e







Assume that, for t<T, the parameters are given as in the above analysis: λf(t)=λi(t)=λ for
all i 6= f, and the system is in steady state.
Now, assume that at time T the frontier society reduces its innovation cost to λ0 <λ . We assume
that this change in R&D technology does not trickle down immediately to the other societies, but
20Building on this historical insight, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) provide a Shumpeterian model in which
economies converge to the high-growth steady-state path only if they can successfully adopt "modern R&D" intro-
duced at the beginning of the industrial revolution.
13spreads as a function of their distance from the frontier in terms of vertical characteristics. In
particular, we assumet h a te a c hs o c i e t yi will reduce its imitation parameter from λi(t)=λ for t<
Ti to λi(t)=λ0 <λfor t ≥ Ti,w h e r eTi is increasing in dv(i,f). To ﬁx ideas, assume:
Ti = T + ζdv(i,f) ζ>0 (22)
As shown in Appendix 1, the transitional dynamics of the economic distance between the frontier
s o c i e t ya n das o c i e t ya tad i s t a n c edv(i,f) > 0 follows the path in Figure 2, with the economic
distance between society i and the frontier peaking at time T0 <T+ ζdv(i,f).
Figure 2 - Path of relative income following a regime change.
Thus, in general, the diﬀusion of modern R&D implies an increase of the eﬀect of genetic distance
on economic distance in the immediate period after the regime change, when most societies are
still too far from the frontier to have adopted the new R&D methods, followed by a decline of the
eﬀect as more societies adopt the better R&D methods and become more eﬀective imitators. The
system will gradually converge to the new steady state, in which, once again, income diﬀerences
will be only a function of the barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations related to the production of
ﬁnal output (i.e., they will be equal to
θ
ψ
[dv(i,f) − dv(j,f)], as before the regime change). This
result can be summarized as follows:
14Implication 3. Following a regime change in R&D, the eﬀect of relative genetic distance on
economic distance will be temporarily higher than in steady state, and then decrease back to its
long-term (positive) level as more societies adopt the improvement in R&D.
As we will see in the Section 4, the actual variation of the eﬀect of genetic distance on economic
distance around the Industrial Revolution follows a pattern that is consistent with Implication 3.
2.3 A General Taxonomy
In order to clarify the nature of the links between genetic distance and economic distance in our
framework, it is useful to introduce a broader classiﬁcation of diﬀerent channels and mechanisms
through which the vertical transmission of characteristics across generations may in principle aﬀect
economic outcomes. We should stress again that these characteristics can be transmitted not
only biologically (through reproduction) but also culturally. A direct link from DNA-transmitted
characteristics to economic outcomes is not necessary for our results, as long as vertical transmission
of cultural characteristics takes place among genetically-related individuals. Our focus is on income
diﬀerences across diﬀerent populations of Homo Sapiens Sapiens, taking place over a relatively short
period in terms of genetic evolution. Therefore we expect that, over that time frame, divergence in
cultural characteristics have played a paramount role.
In general, characteristics can be transmitted across generations through DNA (genetic trans-
mission, or GT - e.g. eye color) or through pure cultural interactions (cultural transmission, or CT
- e.g., a speciﬁc language). Moreover, vertical characteristics, whether passed on through GT or
CT, may aﬀect income diﬀerences because of a direct (D) eﬀects on productivity or because they
constitute barriers (B) to the transmission of innovations across populations.21 Hence, in princi-
ple there are four possible combinations of mechanisms through which vertical characteristics may
aﬀect income diﬀerences. The following chart summarizes the four possibilities.
Direct Eﬀect (D) Barrier Eﬀect (B)
Genetic Transmission (GT) Quadrant I Quadrant II
Cultural Transmission (CT) Quadrant III Quadrant IV
21It is important to notice that these conceptual types should not be viewed as completely separable, but rather as
points on a logical continuum, which may involve a mix of them. For a recent general discussion of the interactions
between biological and cultural transmission, see Richerson and Boyd (2004). Recent results in genetics that are
consistent with complex gene-culture interactions are provided by Wang et al. (2006).
15For instance, genetic traits aﬀecting the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity of children in
the theoretical framework proposed by Galor and Moav (2002) to explain the Industrial Revolution
would be examples of GT direct eﬀects (Quadrant I). GT barrier eﬀects (Quadrant II) could stem
from visible genetically-transmitted characteristics (say, physical appearance) that do not aﬀect
productivity directly, but introduce barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations and technology by
reducing exchanges and learning across populations that perceive each other as diﬀerent.22 Direct
eﬀects of cultural characteristics have been emphasized in a vast sociological literature that goes
back at least to Max Weber.23 A recent empirical study of the relationship between cultural values
and economic outcomes that is consistent with the mechanisms of Quadrant III is provided by
Tabellini (2004). The link between diﬀerences in vertically-transmitted characteristics - including
cultural characteristics, as in Quadrant IV - is at the core of our own model: in our model, diﬀerences
in neutral characteristics (that is, characteristics that do not have a direct eﬀect on productivity
and innovations) explain income diﬀerences by acting as barriers to the diﬀusion of innovation
across populations. As we will see in Section 4, our empirical analysis provides support for our
hypothesis that genetic distance - and in particular, relative genetic distance from the technological
frontier - captures barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of development.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the distinction between GT and CT may be useful to ﬁx
ideas, but is not a clear-cut dichotomy. In fact, this distinction, essentially that between nature
and nurture, may be misleading from an economic perspective, as well as from a biological perspec-
tive. Generally, the economic eﬀects of human characteristics are likely to result from interactions
of cultural and genetic factors, with the eﬀects of genetic characteristics on economic outcomes
changing over space and time depending on cultural characteristics, and vicev e r s a .T oi l l u s t r a t e
this point, consider diﬀerences across individuals within a given population (say, the U.S.). Con-
sider a clearly genetic characteristic of an individual, for instance having two X chromosomes. This
purely genetic characteristic is likely to have had very diﬀerent eﬀects on a person’s income and
other economic outcomes in the year 1900 and in the year 2000, because of changes in culturally
transmitted characteristics over the century. This is a case where the impact of genes on outcomes
22This eﬀect is related to recent work by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), who argue that diﬀerences in physical
characteristics may aﬀect the extent of trust across populations. Visible diﬀerences across ethnic groups also play an
important role in the analysis of ethnic conﬂict by Caselli and Coleman (2002).
23More recent references can be found in the edited volume by Harrison and Huntington (2000).
16varies with a change in cultural characteristics.24
By the same token, one can think of the diﬀerential impact of a given cultural characteristic
(say, the habit of drinking alcohol) on individuals with diﬀerent genetic characteristics (say, genetic
variation in alcohol dehydrogenase, the alcohol-metabolizing enzyme). An example of a complex
interactions in which culture aﬀects genes is the spread of the gene for lactose tolerance in popu-
lations that domesticated cows and goats. In the interpretation of our empirical analysis we will
not dwell much on the distinction between genetic and cultural transmission of characteristics, but
interpret genetic distance as an overall measure of diﬀerences in the whole set of vertically trans-
mitted characteristics. That is, rather than addressing the "nature versus nurture" debate, which is
beyond the scope of our analysis, we interpret our ﬁndings as evidence for the economic importance
of long-term divergence in vertically-transmitted characteristics of diﬀerent populations (i.e., the
diﬀu s i o no fd e v e l o p m e n ti si m p e d e db yb a r r i e r sa r i s i n gf r o md i ﬀerences in vertical characteristics).
That said, it is also true that we ﬁnd clues pointing to cultural transmission rather than purely
genetic transmission as a likely mechanism behind our results. For instance, we ﬁnd large eﬀects of
genetic distance on income diﬀerences within Europe: genetic distance explains income diﬀerences
between populations that are geographically close, have shared very similar environments, and have
had a very short time to diverge genetically (in many cases, less than a few thousand years). Since
cultural change is much faster than genetic change, and most genetic change, especially in the
short-run, is neutral (i.e. unrelated to natural selection), our ﬁndings are consistent with cultural
transmission as a key mechanism explaining persistent income diﬀerences.25
3 The Genetic Distance Data
3.1 Measuring Genetic Distance
Since the data on genetic distance that we use as a measure of distance in vertical characteristics is
not commonly used in the economics literature, and constitutes a central contribution of our paper,
24This is a variation on an example by Alison Gopnik in her comment to the now-famous Pinker vs
Spelke debate at http://www.edge.org/discourse/science-gender.html#ag. Pinker’s response is also available at
http://www.edge.org/discourse/science-gender.html.
25The view that cultural transmission trumps genetic transmission in explaining diﬀerences within human popu-
lations is standard among geneticists and anthropologists. For nontechnical discussions of these issues, see Diamond
(1992, 1997), Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995), Olson (2002) and Richerson and Boyd (2004).
17we describe it in depth.26 G e n e t i cd i s t a n c em e a s u r e sg e n e t i cd i ﬀerences between two populations.
The basic unit of analysis is the allele, or the variant taken by a gene. By sampling populations
for speciﬁc genes, geneticists have compiled data on allele frequencies, i.e. the proportion of the
population with a gene of a speciﬁcv a r i a n t . 27 Diﬀerences in allele frequencies are the basis for
computing summary measures of distance based on aggregated diﬀerences in allele frequencies across
various genes (or loci on a chromosome). Following Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), we will use measures
of FST distance, also known as coancestor coeﬃcients (Reynolds et al., 1983). FST distances, like
most measures of genetic diﬀerences, are based on indices of heterozygosity, the probability that two
alleles at a given locus selected at random from two populations will be diﬀerent. The construction
of FST distances can be illustrated for the simple case of two populations (a and b) of equal size,
one locus, and two alleles (1 and 2). Let pa and qa be the gene frequency of allele 1 and allele 2,
respectively, in population a.28 The probability that two randomly selected genes at a given locus
are identical within the population (homozygosity) is p2
a + q2

















where pb and qb be the gene frequency of allele 1 and allele 2, respectively, in population b.T h e










26As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study of the relationship between genetic distance and diﬀerences in income
per capita across countries. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), in a parallel study, use genetic distance between
European populations as an instrument for a measure of trust in order to explain bilateral trade ﬂows. This is quite
diﬀerent from our application, as we are interested in explaining income diﬀerences, not trade ﬂows. Their results
are consistent with our interpretation of genetic distance as related to barriers.
27Allele frequencies for various genes and for most populations in the world can be found at
http://alfred.med.yale.edu/
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If the two populations have identical allele frequencies (pa = pb), FST is zero. On the other hand,
if the two populations are completely diﬀerent at the given locus (pa =1and pb =0 , or pa =0
and pb =1 ),FST takes value 1. In general, the higher the variation in the allele frequencies across
the two populations, the higher is their FST distance. The formula can be extended to account for
L alleles, S populations, diﬀerent population sizes, and to adjust for sampling bias. The details of
these generalizations are provided in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994, pp. 26-27).29
Measures of genetic distance have been devised mainly to reconstruct phylogenies (or family
trees) of human populations. FST (which is also known as the coancestor coeﬃcient) can be
interpreted as the distance to the most recent common ancestors of two populations, or, equivalently,
as the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations. FST genetic distance is strongly
related to how long two populations have been isolated from each other.30 If two populations split
apart as the result of outmigration, their genes start to change as a result of random genetic drift
and natural selection. When calculating genetic distances in order to study population history
and phylogenesis, geneticists concentrate on neutral characteristics that are not aﬀected by strong
directional selection (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994, p. 36): the term "neutral markers" refers to genes
aﬀected only by random drift.31 It is important to stress that our measures of genetic distance are
based on such neutral markers only, and not on selected traits.
29For a general discussion of measures of genetic distances, see also Nei (1987).
30Isolation here refers to the bulk of the genetic heritage of a given population. As stressed by Cavalli-Sforza et al.
(1994), small amounts of intermixing between members of diﬀerent populations do not change the big picture.
31The classic reference for the neutral theory of molecular evolution is Kimura (1968). For more details on the
neutral theory, the molecular clock hypothesis, and the construction and interpretation of measures of genetic distance,
a recent reference is Jobling et al. (2004).
19When populations become separated, the process of random drift will take them in diﬀerent
directions, raising their genetic distance. The longer the period of separation, the greater genetic
distance becomes. If drift rates are constant, genetic distance can be used as a molecular clock
- that is, as the time elapsed since two populations separated can be measured by the genetic
distance between them. When genetic distance is based on neutral markers, and populations are
suﬃciently large, geneticists have shown that drift rates are indeed constant (very small populations
are generally subject to faster random genetic drift).
To summarize, we use FST distance as a measure of genealogical relatedness between popula-
tions. We expect a larger FST distance to reﬂect a longer separation between populations, and
hence, on average, a larger diﬀerence in vertical characteristics.
3.2 The World Sample
The genetic distance data is from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), p. 75-76. Our main focus on the set
of 42 world populations for which they report all bilateral distances, computed from 120 alleles.32
These populations are aggregated from subpopulations characterized by a high level of genetic
similarity. However, measures of bilateral distance among these subpopulations are available only
regionally, not for the world as a whole. Among the set of 42 world populations, the greatest
genetic distance observed is between Mbuti Pygmies and Papua New-Guineans, where the FST
distance is 0.4573, and the smallest is between the Danish and the English, for which the genetic
distance is 0.0021.33 The mean genetic distance among the 861 available pairs is 0.1338.F i g u r e2 ,
from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), is a phylogenetic tree illustrating the process by which diﬀerent
human populations have split apart over time. The ﬁgure was constructed in order to maximize
the correlation between euclidian distances to common nodes measured along the branches in the
ﬁgure, and the FST genetic distance computed directly from allele frequencies. Thus, genetic
32Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also provide a diﬀerent measure of genetic distance (Nei’s distance). Nei’s distance,
like FST,m e a s u r e sd i ﬀerences in allele frequencies across a set of speciﬁc genes between two populations. FST and
Nei’s distance have slightly diﬀerent theoretical properties, but the diﬀerences are unimportant in practice as their
correlation is 92.9% (Table 1) We show below that the choice of measures does not aﬀect our results.
33Among the more disaggregated data for Europe which we also gathered, the smallest genetic distance (equal
to 0.0009) is between the Dutch and the Danish, and the largest (equal to 0.0667) is between the Lapp and the
Sardinians. The mean genetic distance across European populations is 0.013. As can be seen, genetic distances are
roughly ten times smaller on average across populations of Europe than in the World dataset.
20distance between two populations is approximately the horizontal distance separating them from
the next common node in Figure 4. Such phylogenetic trees, constructed from genetic distance
data, are the population analogs of family trees for individuals.
Figure 3 - Genetic distance among 42 populations. Source: Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994.
Genetic distance data is available at the population level, not at the country level. It was
thus necessary to match populations to countries. We did so using ethnic composition data by
country from Alesina et al. (2003). In many cases, it was possible to match ethnic group labels
with population labels from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), using their Appendices 2 and 3 to identify
the ethnic groups sampled to obtain genetic distances. This was supplemented with information
from Encyclopedia Britannica when the mapping of populations to countries was not achievable
21from ethnic groups data. Obviously, many countries feature several ethnic groups. Whenever the
shares of these groups were available from Alesina et al. (2003) and the match to a genetic group
was possible, we matched each of a country’s ethnic group to a genetic group. For instance, the
Alesina et al. (2003) data on ethnic groups has India composed of 72% of "Indo-Aryans" and
25% "Dravidians". These groups were matched, respectively, to the Cavalli-Sforza groups labeled
"Indians" and "Dravidhans" (i.e. S.E. Indian in Figure 4).34
This match served as the basis for constructing measures of genetic distance between countries,
rather than groups. We constructed two such measures. The ﬁrst was the distance between the
plurality ethnic groups of each country in a pair, i.e. the groups with the largest shares of each
country’s population. This resulted in a dataset of 21,321 pairs of countries (207 underlying
countries and dependencies) with available genetic distance data. The second was a measure of
weighted genetic distance. Some countries, such as the United States or Australia, are made up of
sub-populations that are genetically distant, and for which both genetic distance data and data on
the shares of each genetic group are available. Assume that country 1 contains populations i =1 ...I
and country 2 contains populations j =1 ...J,d e n o t eb ys1i the share of population i in country 1
(similarly for country 2)a n ddij the genetic distance between populations i and j.T h ew e i g h t e d







(s1i × s2j × dij) (30)
where ski is the share of group i in country k, dij is the FST genetic distance between groups i
and j.35 The interpretation of this measure is straightforward: it represents the expected genetic
distance between two randomly selected individuals, one from each country. As we show below,
weighted genetic distance is very highly correlated with genetic distance based on dominant groups,
so for practical purposes it does not make a big diﬀerence which one we use. We will use the FST
distance based on plurality groups as the baseline measure throughout this study, as it allows us
to maximize the number of available observations.
Error in the matching of populations to countries should lead us to understate the correlation
between genetic distance and income diﬀerences. Several regions may be particularly prone to
matching errors. One is Latin America, where it is sometimes diﬃcult to identify whether pop-
34The complete match of genetic groups to ethnic groups, and in turn to countries, is available upon request.
35Due to missing data on group shares, the weighted measure only covers 16,110 pairs, or 180 countries.
22ulations are predominantly of European descent or of Amerindian descent. This is particularly
problematic in countries with large proportions of "Mestizos", i.e. populations of mixed descent,
such as Colombia (in this speciﬁc case the country’s dominant group was matched to the "South
Ameridian" category). Another is Europe, where countries can only be matched to one of three
genetic groups (English, Danish and Italian). As a rule of thumb, we matched countries to groups
that were the closest genetically to that country’s population, using the regional genetic distance
data in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994).
The ethnic composition in Alesina et al. (2003) refers to the 1990s. This is potentially en-
dogenous with respect to current income diﬀerences if the latter are persistent and if areas with
high income potential tended to attract European immigration since 1500. This would be the case
for example under the view that the Europeans settled in the New World due to a favorable geo-
graphical environment.36 In order to construct genetic distance between countries as of 1500, we
also mapped populations to countries using their ethnic composition as of 1500, i.e. prior to the
major colonizations of modern times. Thus, for instance, while the United States is classiﬁed as
predominantly populated with English people for the current match, it is classiﬁed as being popu-
lated with North Amerindians for the 1500 match. This distinction aﬀected mostly countries that
were colonized by Europeans since 1500 to the point where the dominant ethnic group is now of
European descent (New Zealand, Australia, North America and some countries in Latin America).
Genetic distance in 1500 can be used as a convenient instrument for current genetic distance. The
matching of countries to populations for 1500 is also more straightforward than for the current
period, since Cavalli-Sforza et al. attempted to sample populations as they were in 1500, possibly
reducing the extent of measurement error. The correlation between genetic distance for current
populations and for 1500 is 0.658.
3.3 The European Sample
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also present matrices of genetic distance among populations within
several regions. These sub-matrices cannot be merged with the world data, because they are
based on sets of underlying genes distinct from the 120 genes used for the 42 populations in
the world sample. They can, however, be used separately. We assembled a dataset of genetic
36In fact, income diﬀerences are not very persistent at a long time horizon such as this - see Acemoglu et al. (2002).
Our own data shows that pairwise log income diﬀerences in 1500 are uncorrelated with the 1995 series in the common
sample (Table 2).
23distances between 26 European populations, a much ﬁner classiﬁcation than the world sample which
only featured 3 distinct European populations. Matching populations to countries is much more
straightforward for the European sample than for the world sample, because the choice of sampled
European populations generally corresponds to nation-state boundaries. This should reduce the
incidence of measurement error. The populations were matched to 26 countries, resulting in 325
country pairs.37 The largest FST genetic distance among those pairs was 0.032, between Iceland
and Slovenia. The smallest, among countries matched to distinct genetic groups, was between
Denmark and the Netherlands (FST =0 .0009).
4T h e E m p i r i c s o f I n c o m e D i ﬀerences
In this section we test the empirical implications of our model. We investigate the relationship
between genetic distance and economic distance. Genetic distance is considered both relative to
the technological frontier and in absolute terms. In line with our theory, we use the log income
per capita as a metric of economic performance. The data on per capita income is purchasing
power-parity adjusted data from the World Bank, for the year 1995.38
4.1 Genetic Distance to the Frontier
We start with a simple descriptive approach. Suppose that we can pinpoint the technological
frontier. Does a country’s genetic distance to the frontier correlate with its income level? To
investigate this hypothesis, we ran income level regressions. For the World sample, we assumed
the US was the technological frontier. In Europe, we use the UK. These choices seem reasonable
a priori: in the World sample, only Luxemburg and Norway had incomes per capita higher than
37These 26 countries are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The Basque, the Lapp and
the Sardinian populations were not matched to any country, and some countries were matched to the same groups
(Croatio, Slovenia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia were all matched to the "Yugoslavian" population, while the Czech
Republic and Slovak Republics were both matched to the "Czech" population).
38We also used data from the Penn World Tables version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), which made little
diﬀe r e n c ei nt h er e s u l t s . W ef o c u so nt h eW o r l dB a n kd a t af o r1 9 9 5a st h i sa l l o w su st om a x i m i z et h en u m b e ro f
countries in our sample.
24the US in 1995.39 Few would dispute that the US is the world’s major technological innovator.
Although we measure distance to the US using our weighted measure, which is more appropriate
since the US is a genetically diverse country, variation in this measure is dominated by the distance
to the English population. In the Europe sample, genetic distance to the UK is eﬀectively the
distance to the English population, i.e. the distance to the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution,
as well as the distance to the current World frontier (the US). Table 1 presents the results. The
regressions include a number of controls, which will be described and motivated below. For now, it
suﬃces to note that a country’s genetic distance to the US is signiﬁcantly associated with lower per
capita income, even after controlling for a variety of metrics of geographic and other distances. In
column 1, the t-statistic on genetic distance exceeds 10, and genetic distance entered alone accounts
for 35% of the variation in log income levels. Moreover, this result holds within Europe as well,
although the small number of observations (i.e. 25) reduces the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on
genetic distance to the English when geographic controls are added. Figures 4 and 5 display the
univariate results graphically, so the reader can evaluate which countries drive the result.
39It is likely both countries do not owe their economic superiority primarily to their technological inventiveness,
but to natural resource wealth (Norway) and a speciﬁc specialization pattern (Luxemburg).
254.2 Bilateral Approach
To generalize the results of the previous subsection, we consider a speciﬁcation in which the absolute
diﬀerence in income between pairs of countries is regressed on measures of distance between the
countries in this pair. This has two advantages. First, we no longer always need to choose a
technological leader to investigate the correlation between absolute genetic distance and income
diﬀerences (our model led to predictions about the sign of this correlation, see equation 10). Second,
we can make more eﬃcient use of the wealth of bilateral distance data at our disposal. We will use
this bilateral approach for the rest of this paper.
We computed income diﬀerences between all pairs of countries in our sample for which income
data was available, i.e. 13,861 pairs (based on 167 underlying countries). Deﬁne GD
ij as the absolute
genetic distance between countries i and j.D e n o t eGR
ij the genetic distance between i and j relative
to the technological frontier. In most of what follows, we continue to assume the technological




j,US|. Our baseline speciﬁcations are:
|logyi − logyj| = β0 + β1GD
ij + β0
2Xij + εij (31)
26and:
|logyi − logyj| = γ0 + γ1GR
ij + γ0
2Xij + νij (32)
where Xij is a set of measures of geographic and cultural distance and εij and νij are disturbance
terms.40
The reason our empirical speciﬁcation must involve income diﬀerences rather than a single
country’s income level on the left hand side is that this makes the use of bilateral measures of
distance possible. Conceptually, therefore, we depart from existing methodologies: our regression
is not directional, i.e. our speciﬁcation is not simply obtained by diﬀerencing levels regressions
across pairs of countries.41 We should also stress that our speciﬁcations are reduced forms. That
is, diﬀerences in income are presumably the result of diﬀerences in institutions, technologies, human
capital, savings rates, etc., all of which are possibly endogenous with respect to income diﬀerences,
and themselves a function of geographic and human barriers.
Before turning to the results, we must address a technical point regarding the disturbances
εij and νij. In principle, if one is willing to assume that the measures of barriers are exogenous,
equations (31) and (32) can be estimated using least squares. However, in this case usual methods
of inference will be problematic due to spatial correlation resulting from the construction of the
dependent variable.42 Appendix 2 demonstrates that introducing the diﬀerence in log income on
the left hand side results in spatial correlation, and argues that introducing a set of common country
d u m m yv a r i a b l e ss o a k su pt h i ss p a t i a lc o r r e l a t i o n .T h i si sas e to fN dummies, where Dj takes a
value of 1 whenever country j appears in a pair. All of our regressions are least squares regressions
with common country dummies and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
40We also estimated an alternative speciﬁcation where the distance measures were all entered in logs. This did not
lead to appreciable diﬀerences in the economic magnitude or statistical signiﬁc a n c eo fa n yo ft h ee s t i m a t e s . S i n c e
several countries were matched to the same genetic group, so that the corresponding pairs had a genetic distance of
zero, taking logs resulted in the loss of valuable observations.
41Our methodology is more akin to gravity regressions in the empirical trade literature than to levels or growth
regressions in the literature on comparative development.
42This, of course, was not a concern in the simple regressions presented above in Section 4.1. These results featured
t-statistics on the order of 10 in the world sample, the same order of magnitude as that found with the bilateral
approach.
274.3 Unconditional Results
Table 2 presents some summary statistics for our variables. We consider various measures of genetic
distance. Our baseline measure is the FST genetic distance between plurality groups in each country.
We also used weighted FST genetic distance and Nei genetic distance based on plurality groups.
These measures bear high correlations among themselves, so in practice it matters little which one
we use. On the other hand, the theoretically more appropriate measure of relative distance to the
frontier bears a correlation of only 0.55 with absolute FST genetic distance (for the measure based
on plurality groups, this is simply the relative genetic distance to the English population). Finally,
we considered FST genetic distance with countries matched to populations as they were in 1500.
The correlation between this variable and the current measure is 0.68.
Our measure of absolute FST genetic distance, GD, bears a positive correlations of 0.14 with
the absolute value of log income diﬀerences in 1995. Genetic distance relative to the frontier, GR,
bears a higher correlation with income diﬀerences, equal to 0.23, in line with our model’s prediction.
These correlations are higher in the European sample, respectively 0.29 and 0.31.
Table 3 presents regressions of income diﬀerences on various measures of genetic distance. As
a measure of the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, we report the standardized beta coeﬃcient on
genetic distance for each regression.43 Column 1 shows that, when entered alone in the regression,
one standard deviation in FST genetic distance accounts for 21.77% of a standard deviation of
income diﬀerences. This eﬀect rises in magnitude when we consider genetic distance relative to the
frontier, as predicted by Implication 2 of our model (column 2). The eﬀect is also larger when Nei
and weighted genetic distance are used instead (columns 3 and 4). The eﬀect is yet larger when we
use the weighted FST genetic distance relative to the frontier, reaching 30.49% (column 5).
We next make use of data from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) on the standard deviation of the
genetic distance estimates. Since these data are based on allele frequencies collected from samples
of diﬀerent sizes, they are estimated more or less precisely depending on population pairs. We have
data on the standard errors of each estimate of genetic distance, obtained from bootstrap analysis.
In column 6, we linearly downweigh observations with high standard errors on genetic distance. As
expected, the magnitude of the resulting weighted least squares eﬀect of FST genetic distance is
larger than under simple OLS, consistent with the idea that measurement error is greater for pairs
43The standardized beta is deﬁned as the eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in the regressor expressed as a
percentage of one standard deviation of the dependent variable
28with high standard errors on genetic distance.
While providing suggestive evidence in favor of implications 1 and 2 of our theoretical model,
these unconditional results may confound the eﬀect of barriers linked to vertical characteristics with
geographic barriers. In the next subsection, we control for a large number of measures of geographic
distance. In everything that follows we will focus on the relative genetic distance to the frontier
as the baseline measure of genetic distance, since it is the theoretically more appropriate measure.
We also focus on the measure based on plurality groups, since it allows for more observations - if
anything using the weighted measure would raise the magnitude of the eﬀect of genetic distance.
4.4 Controlling for Geographic Factors
Genetic distance and geographic isolation are like l yt ob eh i g h l yc o r r e l a t e d .T h em o r ei s o l a t e dt w o
groups become, the more they will drift apart genetically, since genetic admixture is made diﬃcult
by geographic barriers. It is therefore important to adequately control for geographic isolation:
f a i l i n gt od os ow o u l da s c r i b et og e n e t i cd i s t a n c ea ne ﬀect that should be attributed to geographic
distance. In this subsection, we control for a vast array of measures of geographic isolation.
Distance Metrics. Our ﬁrst set of measures of geographic isolation between countries consists
of various measures of distance. We consider a measure of the greater circle (geodesic) distance
between the major cities of the countries in our sample, from a new dataset compiled by researchers
at CEPII.44 We also include latitudinal distance - i.e. simply the absolute value of the diﬀerence
in latitude between the two countries i and j in each pair: GLA
ij = |latitudei − latitudej|. Latitude
could be associated with climatic factors that aﬀect income levels directly, as in Gallup, Mellinger
and Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2001). Latitude diﬀerences would also act as barriers to technological
diﬀusion: Diamond (1997) suggests that barriers to the transmission of technology are greater along
the latitude direction than along the longitude direction, because similar longitudes share the same
climate, availability of domesticable animal species, soil conditions, etc. We should therefore expect
countries at similar latitudes to also display similar levels of income. Third, we use a measure of
44The data is available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. This dataset features various
measures of distance (between major cities, between capitals, weighted using several distances between several major
cities, etc.), all of which bear pairwise correlations that exceed 99%. The dataset also includes other useful geograph-
ical and historical controls, such as whether pairs of countries whether the countries are contiguous, whether they






¯, to capture possible geographic isolation
along this alternative axis.45
Perhaps surprisingly, raw correlations between genetic distance and these simple measures of
geographic distance are not as high as we might have expected. For instance, the correlation
between geodesic distance and FST genetic distance is only 35.4% - though unsurprisingly it rises
to 47.8% if genetic distance is measured based on populations as they were in 1500, because the
colonization era acted to weaken the link between genetic distance and geographic distance by
shuﬄing populations across the globe.
Table 4, column 1 includes these three measures jointly with FST g e n e t i cd i s t a n c er e l a t i v et ot h e
frontier. The eﬀect of relative genetic distance falls slightly in magnitude, compared to column 2 of
Table 3, as expected. We ﬁnd evidence that geodesic distance acts as a barrier - the standardized
beta on this variable is 13.77%. The economic signiﬁcance of latitudinal and longitudinal distance
is very close to zero.
Microgeographic factors. In addition to these straightforward distance measures, we controlled
for other measures of isolation between countries. In the context of gravity regressions, Giuliano et
al. (2006) argued that genetic distance was likely correlated with features of the terrain that raise
transport costs. These "microgeographic" features may not be well captured by simple metrics
of distance. To account for this possibility, we included dummy variables taking a value of 1 if
countries in a pair were contiguous, if they had access to a common sea or ocean, if any country
in a pair was an island or was landlocked.46 Column 2 of Table 4 shows these variables have the
expected signs, but their inclusion does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on genetic distance. In column 3,
we follow the approach in Giuliano et al. (2006), and attempt to control directly for transport costs,
using the ratio of CIF to FOB exports.47 Following their work, we also included the diﬀerence in
average elevation as a control. This led to a larger eﬀect of genetic distance, although in large part
45In our regressions, we entered these distances in abolute terms. Using geographic distance relative to the fron-
tier instead did not change our results - if anything doing so raised the magnitude of the genetic distance eﬀect.
Corresponding estimates are available upon request.
46The common sea variable is the same as that used in Giuliano et al. (2006).
47We use the approach in Limao and Venables (2001), Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) and Giuliano et al. (2006).
The measure of indirect trade costs is ITCij =( CIFij/FOBij)−1, and the data (for 1980-2005) come from the IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics. We also control for elevation diﬀerences, as in Giuliano et al. (2006).
30due to a diﬀerent sample rather than the inclusion of the additional controls: we lose over 10,000
observations due to the limited availability of the proxy for transport costs. To summarize, although
the additional controls have explanatory power for income diﬀerences, we found no evidence that
the inclusion of microgeographic factors modiﬁes the eﬀect of genetic distance.
Climatic Similarity. Next, we constructed measures of climatic similarity based on 12 Koeppen-
Geiger climate zones.48 O n em e a s u r ei st h ea v e r a g ea b s o l u t ev a l u ed i ﬀerence, between two countries,
in the percentage of land area in each of the 12 climate zones. Countries have identical climates,
under this measure, if they have identical shares of their land areas in the same climates. As
a simpler alternative, we used the absolute diﬀerence in the percentage of land areas in tropical
climates. As with latitude, climate may have direct eﬀects on productivity, or barrier eﬀects on
technological diﬀusion: countries located in diﬀerent climates may have experienced diﬃculties in
adopting each other’s mode of production, particularly in the agrarian era. Columns 4 and 5 of
Table 4 report the results. As expected, climatic diﬀerences are associated with greater income
diﬀerences, even controlling for latitude diﬀerences. However, the inclusion of these variables hardly
aﬀects the coeﬃcient on genetic distance.
Continent Eﬀects. The largest genetic distances observed in our worldwide dataset occur be-
tween populations that live on diﬀerent continents. One concern is that genetic distance may simply
be picking up the eﬀect of cross-continental barriers to the diﬀusion of development, i.e. continent
eﬀects. If this were the case, it would still leave open the question of how to interpret economically
these continent eﬀects, but to test explicitly for this possibility, we added to our baseline speciﬁ-
cation two sets of continent dummies. We included one set of 7 dummies (one for each continent)
taking on a value of one if the two countries in a pair are on the same continent. We also included
a set of 7 dummies each equal to one if exactly one country belongs to a given continent, and the
other not. The results are in column 6 of Table 4. The inclusion of continent dummies reduces by
about one third the magnitude of the genetic distance eﬀect, but the latter remains statistically
signiﬁcant. We will provide further evidence on the within-continent eﬀects of genetic distance
48The 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones are: tropical rainforest climate (Af), monsoon variety of Af (Am), tropical
savannah climate (Aw), steppe climate (BS), desert climate(BW), mild humid climate with no dry season (Cf), mild
humid climate with a dry summer (Cs), mild humid climate with a dry winter (Cw), snowy-forest climate with a dry
winter (Dw), snowy-forest climate with a moist winter (Ds), tundra/polar ice climate (E) and highland climate (H).
The data, compiled by Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs, is available at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/eidata/.
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Possible Endogeneity of Current Genetic Distance. We attempted to control for the possi-
ble endogeneity of genetic distance with respect to income diﬀerences. While diﬀerences in (neutral)
allele frequencies between the populations of two countries do not result causally from income dif-
ferences, migration could lead to a pattern of genetic distances today that is closely linked to
current income diﬀerences. Consider for instance the pattern of colonization of the New World
starting after 1500. Europeans tended to settle in larger numbers in the temperate climates of
North America and Oceania. If geographic factors bear a direct eﬀect on income levels, and were
not properly accounted for in our regressions through included control variables, then genetic dis-
tance today could be positively related to income distance not because genetic distance precluded
the diﬀusion of development, but because similar populations settled in regions prone to generating
similar incomes.
To assess this possibility, column 1 of Table 5 excludes from the sample any pairs involving one
or more countries from the New World (deﬁned as countries in North America, Latin America, the
Caribbean and Oceania), where the endogeneity problem is likely to be most acute. The eﬀect of
genetic distance falls slightly, but remains commensurate with the one we estimated before. The
diﬀerence in latitudes becomes much larger, an observation to which we shall return below. Next,
we use our data on FST genetic distance as of 1500 as an instrument for current genetic distance
in column 2 of Table 5. This variable reﬂects genetic distance between populations as they were
before the great migrations of the modern era, i.e. as determined since the Neolithic era, and yet
is highly correlated (65.8%) with current genetic distance, so it fulﬁlls the conditions of a valid
i n s t r u m e n t .H e r e ,t h em a g n i t u d eo ft h eg e n e t i cd i s t a n c ee ﬀe c ti sr a i s e db ya l m o s to n et h i r d ,w i t h
a standardized beta reaching 27.8%. As is usual in this type of application, the larger estimated
eﬀect may come from a lower incidence of measurement error under IV - as explained above the
matching of populations to countries is much more straightforward for the 1500 match.
The Diamond Gap. Jared Diamond’s (1997) inﬂuential book stressed that diﬀerences in latitude
played an important role as barriers to the transfer of technological innovations in early human
history, and later in the pre-industrial era, an eﬀect that could have persisted to this day. Our
estimates of the eﬀect of latitudinal distance provided little evidence that this eﬀect was still at play:
in our regressions we found only weak evidence that diﬀerences in latitudes help explain income
32diﬀerences across countries, although this eﬀect was much larger when excluding the New World
from our sample. However, Diamond took his argument one step further, and argued that Eurasia
enjoyed major advantages in the development of agriculture and animal domestication because a) it
had the largest number of potentially domesticable plants and animals, and b) had a predominantly
East-West axis that allowed an easier and faster diﬀusion of domesticated species. By contrast,
diﬀerences in latitudes in the Americas and Africa created major environmental barriers to the
diﬀusion of species and innovations. More generally, Eurasia might have enjoyed additional beneﬁts
in the production and transfer of technological and institutional innovations because of its large
size.49 It is important to properly control for Diamond’s geography story as it is either a substitute
or a complement to ours.
To test and control for a Eurasian eﬀect, we constructed a dummy variable that takes on a value
of 1 if one and only one of the countries in each pair is in Eurasia, and 0 otherwise (the "Diamond
gap").50 In order to test Diamond’s hypothesis, we added the Diamond gap to regressions explaining
income diﬀerences in 1995 (column 3 of Table 5) and, using Maddison’s historical income data, in
1500 (column 4). For the former regression, we restricted our sample to the Old World.51 As
expected, in the regression for 1995 income diﬀerences, the Diamond gap enters with a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, and its inclusion reduces (but does not come close to eliminating) the
eﬀect of genetic distance. In column 4, using 1500 income diﬀerences as a dependent variable, the
Diamond gap is also signiﬁcant and large in magnitude, despite the paucity of observations. This
provides suggestive quantitative evidence in favor of Diamond’s observation that the diﬀusion of
development was faster in Eurasia. We also conclude that genetic distance between populations
plays an important role in explaining income diﬀerences even when controlling for the environmental
advantages and disadvantages associated with Eurasia, so Diamond’s hypothesis on the long-term
diﬀusion of development is complementary to ours.
49This point is stressed in Kremer (1993). See also Masters and McMillan (2001).
50For further tests providing statistical support for Diamond’s observations, see Olsson and Hibbs (2005).
51It is appropriate to exclude the New World from the sample when using 1995 incomes because Diamond’s theory
is about the geographic advantages that allowed Eurasians to settle and dominate the New World. If we were to
include the New World in a regression explaining income diﬀerences today, we would include the higher income per
capita of non-aboriginal populations who are there because of guns, germs and steel, i.e. thanks to their ancestors’
Eurasian advantage.
334.5 Controlling for Common History and Cultural Distance
In this subsection we control for additional possible determinants of income diﬀerences.52 We ﬁrst
consider common history variables: countries that have shared a common history, for instance a
common colonial past, may be closer genetically, culturally and economically. Second, we examine
the issue of cultural distance, which is also potentially correlated with both genetic distance and
income diﬀerences. As argued in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) there is usually very little genetic
admixture between populations that speak diﬀerent languages, for instance, so irrespective of their
physical distance linguistically distant populations should also be genetically distant.53 Moreover,
as we have argued in Section 2, genetic distance may be associated with diﬀerences in vertical
characteristics transmitted culturally, rather than genetically. The types of barriers captured by
genealogical relatedness (i.e. genetic distance) likely include slow-moving cultural barriers, such
as linguistic barriers and diﬀerence in norms or values. Are there speciﬁc cultural traits that are
correlated with genetic distance, and that are directly measurable? How much of the estimated
eﬀect of genetic distance is attributable to diﬀerences in speciﬁc measurable cultural characteristics?
Measuring cultural distance is fraught with diﬃculties. In a well-known survey over ﬁfty years
ago Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) listed 164 deﬁnitions of culture proposed by historians and
social scientists. We will adopt a more parsimonious approach, conﬁning our attention to measures
of linguistic and religious distance.
Common history controls. We ﬁrst control for variables representing a pair’s common historical
experience. These are dummy variables for pairs that were ever part of the same country (for
example Austria and Hungary), were ever in a colonial relationship, have shared a common colonizer
since 1945 and are currently in a colonial relationship (such as France and French Polynesia).
These variables all bear the expected signs (Table 7, column 1); for instance having had a common
colonizer or having been part of the same country are associated with smaller income diﬀerences.
The inclusion of these variables in the regression does not aﬀect the magnitude of the genetic
52Throughout this subsection we will use the speciﬁcation in column 2 of Table 4 as the baseline - i.e. we include
a large array of geographic isolation controls.
53A well-known example is that of the hunter-gathering Mbuti Pygmies and the sedentary agragrian populations
of Bantu descent in central regions of Africa. Despite living geographically close to each other for about 3000 years
- sometimes only a few miles apart - these populations rarely intermixed, retained vastly diﬀerent technologies, and
correspondingly remained very distant genetically.
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Linguistic distance. The most salient example of a slowly changing culturally transmitted char-
acteristic is language: it is transmitted across generations within a population, yet there is no gene
for speaking speciﬁc languages. We attempt to measure linguistic distance in two ways.
Our ﬁrst approach follows Fearon (2003). Fearon used data from Ethnologue to create linguistic
trees, classifying languages into common families and displaying graphically the degree of related-
ness of world languages. The linguistic tree in this dataset contains up to 15 nested classiﬁcations.
If two languages share many common nodes in the tree, these languages are more likely to trace
their roots to a more recent common ancestor language. The number of common nodes in the
linguistic tree, then, is a measure of linguistic similarity. For instance, according to this measure,
French and Italian share 4 common nodes - both belong to the Indo-European / Italic / Romance
/ Italo-Western linguistic groupings. Using data on the linguistic composition of countries (also
from Fearon, 2003), and matching languages to countries, we can construct indices of linguistic
distance between countries. We did so, as for genetic distance, in two ways: ﬁrst, we computed a
measure of the number of common nodes shared by the dominant languages for each country pair.
Second, we computed a weighted measure of linguistic similarity, representing the expected number
of common linguistic nodes between two randomly chosen individuals, one from each country in a
pair (the formula is the same as that of equation 30).54 Following Fearon (2003), we transformed
each of these series so that they are increasing in linguistic distance (LD) and bounded by 0 and 1:
LD =
r
(15 − # Common Nodes)
15
(33)
Our second measure of linguistic distance is based on work in the ﬁeld of lexicostatistics (a
branch of linguistics). We use data from Dyen, Kruskal and Black (1992). They assembled data on
200 common "meanings" from all Indo-European languages. For each language, they compiled lists
of words expressing these meanings. When words from two languages expressing a given meaning
originated from a common source, these words were labelled as "cognate". For instance, the word
"table" in French and "tavola" in Italian are cognate because both stem from the word "tabula"
in Latin. Aggregating over the 200 meanings, a measure of linguistic similarity is the percentage of
cognate words. Again, the greater the percentage of cognate words, the more recently the languages
54Using the measure based on the plurality language or the weigthed measure did not make any diﬀerence for the
results. We focus on the former in our empirical work.
35shared a common ancestor language. In contrast to the linguistic trees data, this measure has the
advantage of being a continuous measure of similarity. Its main drawback is that it is only available
for Indo-European languages, so the geographic coverage is reduced to 72 countries.
Pairwise correlations between measures of genetic and linguistic distances are displayed in Table
6. These correlations are positive, as expected, but contrary to our expectations they are not very
large in magnitude. For instance, the correlation between FST genetic distance and linguistic
distance based on dominant languages is 0.219. Turning to regression analysis, in Table 7, columns
2 and 3, both linguistic distance and the % cognate measure enter with the expected signs and
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.55 Thus, greater linguistic distance is associated with
greater economic diﬀerences. The magnitude of the eﬀect is very modest for the data based on
linguistic trees, and larger for the lexicostatistical measure (with a standardized beta equal to 10%).
However, these variables do not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on genetic distance.
Religious distance. Our second measure of cultural distance is based on religious diﬀerences.
Religion also tends to be transmitted intergenerationally within populations. We followed an ap-
proach similar to that used for linguistic distance. We relied on a nomenclature of world religions
obtained from Mecham, Fearon and Laitin (2006).56 This nomenclature was broken down into re-
ligious families, ﬁrst distinguishing between monotheistic religions of Middle-Eastern origin, Asian
religions and "others", then subdividing each group into ﬁner groups (such as Christians, Muslims
a n dJ e w s )a n ds oo n .T h en u m b e ro fc o m m o nc l a s s i ﬁcations (up to 5 in this dataset) is a measure
of religious proximity. We matched religions to countries using Mecham, Fearon and Laitin (2006)’s
data on the prevalence of religions by country and transformed the data in a manner similar to
that in equation (33). Table 6 shows that while religious distance bears a correlation of 0.347 with
linguistic distance, it is largely uncorrelated with genetic distance, either absolute or relative.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7 enters this measure of religious distance into our baseline speciﬁ-
cation, either alone or jointly with linguistic distance.57 Religious distance is positively associated
with income diﬀerences, and the standardized beta coeﬃcient on this variable is about 10%. Again,
55As with geographic distance, we also used measures of cultural distance relative to the frontier (available upon
request). This did not lead to any appreciable diﬀerences in our results.
56An alternative classiﬁcation obtained from the World Christian Database, with only 3 nested classiﬁcations, did
not lead to appreciably diﬀerent results.
57Again, the results were unchanged when using religious distance relative to the US, or weighted religious distance.
36however, its introduction only marginally aﬀects the coeﬃcient on genetic distance.
Interpretation and Observations. These results have several interpretations. The most straight-
forward interpretation is that diﬀerences in vertical characteristics captured by genetic distance are
not primarily linguistic and religious in nature. Another interpretation is that the speciﬁcm e a s u r e s
of linguistic and religious distance that we use are inadequate. Consider linguistic distance. It is
well-known that linguistic and genetic trees look very similar, as demonstrated in Cavalli-Sforza et
al. (1994, p. 98-105). The reason is straightforward: genes, like languages, are transmitted inter-
generationally, and this insight is the basis for our interpretation of genetic distance as capturing
the full set of vertical characteristics, both genetic and cultural. Yet the correlation between our
measure of genetic distance and linguistic distance is quite low. This may be partly due to the fact
that genetic distance is a continuous measure of distance, whereas the number of nodes is a discrete
measure of linguistic distance.58 The lexicostatistical measure we used addresses this problem, but
comes at a cost of losing almost half of the countries in our sample.
Whatever the interpretation, our results show that genetic distance, as an overall measure of
diﬀerences in vertical characteristics, is robustly correlated with income diﬀerences, and we were
not able to identify speciﬁc measures of cultural distance that could alter this conclusion.
4.6 Alternative Time Periods and Samples
4.6.1 Historical Income Data.
Our model led to testable predictions relating to the time path of the eﬀect of genetic distance on
income diﬀerences in the aftermath of a regime change in R&D technologies. In this section we
examine the time variation in the eﬀect of genetic distance in the 500 years that surrounded the
Industrial Revolution. We ﬁnd a pattern of coeﬃcients supportive of our model of diﬀusion.
In Table 8, we use income per capita data since 1500 from Maddison (2003), and repeated
our basic reduced form regression for 1500, 1700, 1820, 1870, 1913 and 1960.59 As before, our
58Populations may share few common nodes but linguistic splits occurred recently, in which case one is overesti-
mating distance, or they may share lots of common nodes but the last split occurred a long time ago, in which case
one is underestimating distance.
59These dates were chosen to maximize the number of observations. The data on income for 1960 is from the Penn
World Tables version 6.1. For comparison, column 7 reproduces the results for 1995.
37measure of genetic distance is relative to the English. For the 1500 and 1700 regressions, we use
the early match for genetic distance, i.e. genetic distance between populations as they were in
1492, prior to the discovery of the Americas and the great migrations of modern times.60 For the
subsequent periods we use the current match. Table 8 shows that across all periods, the coeﬃcient
on relative genetic distance is statistically signiﬁcant and positive. Moreover, the magnitudes are
much larger than for the current period: in regressions obtained from a common sample of 26
countries (275 pairs) for which data is continuously available, standardized beta coeﬃcients range
from 18.58% (1995) to 67.76% (1870). Thus, genetic distance is strongly positively correlated with
income diﬀerences throughout modern history. It is worth noting that genetic distance bears a
large, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on income diﬀerences for the past ﬁve centuries, even though
income diﬀerences in 1500 and in 1995 are basically uncorrelated (Table 2 shows this correlation to
be −0.051 for the 325 country pairs for which data is available). This fact is consistent with our
interpretation of genetic distance as a barrier to the diﬀusion of innovations across populations.
Strong evidence for our model of barriers to diﬀusion can be obtained from plotting the time path
of coeﬃcients, as is done in Figure 6. The result is striking. The slope coeﬃcient of genetic distance
decreases gradually from 1500 to 1820, then spikes up in 1870 during the Industrial Revolution and
declines thereafter. The shape of the time path, described in Figure 6, is precisely that predicted
by our theory (compare this ﬁgure with Figure 2). This is fully consistent with our model where
a major shift in the growth regime (the Industrial Revolution) initially results in large income
discrepancies. These discrepancies persist in proportion to genealogical relatedness. As more and
more countries adopt the major innovation, the impact of genetic distance progressively declines.
60Regressions for these early periods feature at most 29 countries. These countries are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States. There were 275 pairs (26 countries) with available data for 1500 income, and 328 pairs (29
countries) for 1700.
38Figure 6 - Time path of the eﬀect of relative genetic distance on income diﬀerences, 1500-1995.
4.6.2 Genetic Distance across European Countries.
Analyzing the European data can be informative for several reasons. First, it constitutes a ro-
bustness check on the worldwide results. Second, matching populations to countries is much more
straightforward for Europe than for the rest of the world, because the choice of sampled Euro-
pean populations happens to match nation-state boundaries. This should reduce the incidence of
measurement error. Third, genetic distances are orders of magnitude smaller across countries of
Europe, and genetic speciﬁcities within Europe have developed over the last few thousand years
(and not tens of thousands of years). It is very unlikely that any genetic traits have risen to promi-
nence within Europe as the result of strong natural selection over such a short period of time, so
a ﬁnding that genetic distance based on neutral markers within Europe is associated with income
diﬀerences would be evidence that barriers to the diﬀusion of development are primarily induced
by diﬀerences in culturally transmitted traits.
Table 9 presents the results. Genetic distance is again positively and signiﬁcantly associated
with income diﬀerences. Moreover, while genetic distance across European countries are smaller
than in the World sample, so are the income diﬀerences to be explained. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect
39of FST distance is large in magnitude. In the baseline estimate in column 2 of Table 9, which
includes geographic controls, the standardized beta coeﬃc i e n to ng e n e t i cd i s t a n c er e l a t i v et ot h e
English equals 44.44% - twice that obtained from the World sample. Physical distance measures
bear small or insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, suggesting that geographic barriers are not a big hindrance
to the diﬀusion of income across countries of Europe, although their introduction does reduce the
eﬀect of genetic distance from the unconditional baseline of column 1. We ﬁnd that introducing
the lexicostatistical measure of linguistic similarity into the regression (column 5) reduces the eﬀect
of genetic distance by half, and this is not an artifact of the reduced sample (a regression on the
same sample that excludes the percent cognate measure results in a standardized beta on relative
genetic distance of 38.9%). This is one instance where we are able to identify a speciﬁcc u l t u r a l l y
transmitted trait that seems to account for some of the eﬀect of genetic distance. The last column of
Table 9 shows that genetic distance accounts for an even greater amount (79.59%)o ft h ev a r i a t i o n
in income diﬀerences in 1870, during the Industrial Revolution. Again, we take these diﬀerences in
estimated magnitudes as consistent with our barriers interpretation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we make two contributions: (1) For the ﬁrst time, we document a statistically and eco-
nomically signiﬁcant positive relationship between measures of genetic distance and cross-country
income diﬀerences, even when controlling for various other measures of geographical, cultural and
historical diﬀerences; and (2) we provide an economic interpretation of these ﬁndings, based on
barriers to the diﬀusion of development.
O u re c o n o m i cm o d e li sb a s e do nt w ok e yh y p o t h e s e s .T h eﬁrst hypothesis is that, on average,
genetic distance captures divergence in characteristics that are transmitted vertically across gener-
ations within populations over the very long run. Genetic distance, measuring the time since two
populations shared common ancestors, provides an ideal summary of divergence in slowly-changing
genealogically-transmitted characteristics, including culturally-transmitted traits (habits, customs,
etc.). Our second hypothesis is that such diﬀerences in long-term vertically-transmitted character-
istics act as barriers to the horizontal diﬀusion of innovations from the world technological frontier.
Societies that are genealogically farther from the innovators have faced higher costs to imitate and
adapt new productivity-enhancing technologies and institutions.
As we have shown, the empirical evidence over time and space is consistent with the barriers
40interpretation: we have found, consistent with our theoretical framework, that the eﬀect on eco-
nomic distance associated with relative genetic distance from the technological frontier is larger
than the eﬀect of absolute genetic distance. We have also found that the eﬀect has varied across
time and space in ways that support our diﬀusion-from-the-frontier interpretation: the eﬀect has
increased in the ﬁrst part of the 19th century, peaked in 1870, and has been decreasing afterwards,
consistent with the view that relative genetic distance captures barriers to the diﬀusion of the In-
dustrial Revolution. Some evidence, particularly the results for European countries, also suggests
that these diﬀerences may stem in substantial part from cultural (rather than purely biological)
transmission of characteristics across generations.
While our analysis provides a general macroeconomic framework to interpret our empirical
ﬁndings, the study of the speciﬁc microeconomic mechanisms through which the eﬀects operate is
left for future research. For example, an analysis of microeconomic data may shed light on the
relations among genetic distance, vertical characteristics, imitation costs, and the spread of speciﬁc
innovations. So far, we were not able to show that linguistic or religious barriers, two culturally
transmitted characteristics, are responsible for the eﬀect of genetic distance. This does not preclude
a role for other slow-changing culturally transmitted traits, such as norms or values. These are
inherently harder to measure, particularly within the long term, macroeconomic perspective that
we adopted, necessitating a more microeconomic approach. Another natural extension of our work
w o u l db et oi n v e s t i g a t ew h e t h e ra n dh o wg e n e t i cd i s t a n c ea ﬀects bilateral exchanges and interac-
tions between diﬀerent groups and societies, both peacefully (e.g., trade, foreign direct investment)
and non-peacefully (conﬂict and wars).61 Finally, it could be interesting to link our results to the
vast literature on demography and economic growth, and explore the connections between genetic
distance, vertically-transmitted characteristics, and demographic patterns.62
A ﬁnal consideration is about policy implications. A common concern with research docu-
menting the importance of variables like genetic distance or geography is pessimism about policy
implications. What use is it to know that genetic distance explains income diﬀerences, if one cannot
change genetic distance, at least in the short run? These concerns miss a bigger point: available
policy variables may have a major impact not on genetic distance itself, but on the coeﬃcient that
61In preliminary work, using gravity equations, we indeed ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect of genetic distance as
a determinant of bilateral trade, controlling for a large number of geographical variables.
62See Galor (2005) for an in-depth discussion of this literature. See also Richerson and Boyd (2004) for an anthro-
pological perpective.
41measure the eﬀect of genetic distance on income diﬀerences. That coeﬃcient has been changing
over time, and can change further. If we are correct in interpreting our results as evidence for long-
term barriers across diﬀerent populations and cultures, signiﬁcant reductions in income disparities
could be obtained by encouraging policies that reduce those barriers, including eﬀorts to translate
and adapt technological and institutional innovations into diﬀerent cultures and traditions, and
to foster cross-cultural exchanges. More work is needed - at the micro as well as macro level - in
order to understand the speciﬁc mechanisms, market forces, and policies that could facilitate the
diﬀusion of development across countries with distinct long-term histories and cultures.
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Appendix 1
Transitional Dynamics after a Regime Change in R&D
For simplicity and without much loss of generality, we will illustrate the eﬀect of a regime-change
in R&D for the case ψ =1 . Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997; 2003 chapter 8), we describe
the dynamic analysis for the variables B ≡ Ai/Af and χ ≡ Ci/Ai. One can easily show that the



























T h ed y n a m i c so ft h i ss y s t e mo fd i ﬀerential equations can be described with a phase diagram in
(B,χ) space, as in Figure A1.












while the locus for
dχ
dt





Assume that the R&D parameters are λf = λi = λ Then, in steady-state we have:






If at time T both R&D parameters were to decrease to λ0 <λinstantaneously, the system would
immediately jump to the new steady state, as in Figure A2, with the same value for the state




Figure A2 - Instantaneous diﬀusion of the new R&D technology
Therefore, an instantaneous adjustment of the R&D technology parameter in both societies
(leader and follower) would imply a higher growth rate in both economies, and no change in their
economic distance (i.e., lnYf − lnYi = −lnB∗ would remain the same).
48Now, in contrast, assume that at time T the frontier society introduces a lower unit cost for
R&D (λf(t)=λ0 <λfor all t ≥ T), while society i will be able to reduce its R&D parameter
λi(t) only with a delay ζdv(f,i),s ot h a tλi(t)=λ for t<T + ζdv(f,i) and λi(t)=λ0 <λfor
t ≥ T+ ζdv(f,i). Under the assumption that the time of the adjustment to the lower cost λ0 is
fully anticipated by the representative consumer at time T, the system will follow the dynamics of
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e−θdv(i,f) (the "temporary" loci for dχ/dt =
0 and dB/dt =0are denoted with the dotted lines in Figure A3). After time T the system will
follow the "temporary" dynamics consistent with the above diﬀerential equations. Since the future
change in the R&D parameter is fully anticipated, the dynamic path of the system during the
temporary phase - that is, for T<T + ζd(i,f), - must follow dynamics such that, at time T+
ζd(f,i), the variables χ(t) and B(t) are on the saddle path of the new "permanent" system. The
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and has the same steady-state value for B as the old system before time T. Therefore, as shown in






λ0 − ρ]B (44)
After that, B(t) will start increasing again, and will converge back to its initial value B∗ =
e−θdv(i,f). Therefore, the economic distance lnYf(t) − lnYi(t)=−lnB(t) will increase after T,
peak before T+ ζd(f,i), and then decrease back to the steady state level −lnB∗,a ss h o w ni n
Figure 3 in Section 3. A similar patter will be followed by the economic distance between a society
which is very close to the frontier and a society that is farther from the frontier. Eventually,
after time T+ ζ maxd(f,i), all societies will have adopted imitation technologies with the lower
63Clearly B2 will be reached at a time T
0 smaller than T+ ζd(f,i) since that point must be reached before the
system converges to the new saddle path.
49parameter λ0,a n dt h ee ﬀect of relative distance on economic distance will be back to the steady-
s t a t ev a l u eb e f o r et h er e g i m ec h a n g e-t h a ti s ,t olnYf − lnYi = −lnB∗ = θ[dv(i,f) − dv(j,f)]
(Implication 3).
Figure A3 - Delayed diﬀusion of the new R&D technology
Appendix 2
Estimation method for the bilateral regressions
Consider three countries, 1, 2 and 3. Observations on the dependent variable |logy1 − logy2|
and |logy1 − logy3| will be correlated by virtue of the presence of country 1 in both observations.
Conditioning on the right-hand side variables (which are bilateral in nature) should reduce cross-
sectional dependence in the errors ε12 and ε13, but we are unwilling to assume that observations
on the dependent variable are independent conditional on the regressors.64 In other words, simple
least squares standard errors will lead to misleading inferences due to spatial correlation.
64Another feature that reduces the dependence across pairs is the fact that the dependent variable involves the
absolute value of log income diﬀerences. Simple simulations show that under i.i.d. Normal income draws with
moments equal to those observed in our sample, the correlation between absolute value diﬀerences in income for any
two pair containing the same country will be about 0.22. Without taking absolute values, it is straightforward to
notice that the correlation would be exactly 0.5. Hence, taking absolute values reduces the cross-sectional dependence
induced by the construction of the dependent variable..
50Before proceeding, we note the following: with N countries, there are N(N−1)/2 distinct pairs.
Denote the observation on absolute value income diﬀerences between country i and country j as
dyij. Pairs are ordered so that country 1 appears in position i and is matched with all countries
from 2...N appearing in position j.T h e n c o u n t r y 2 is in position i and is matched with 3...N
appearing in position j, and so on. The last observation has country N − 1 in position i and
country N in position j. We denote the non-zero oﬀ-diagonal elements of the residual covariance
matrix by σm where m is the country common to each pair.
A simple example when the number of countries is N =4is illustrative. In this case, under our
maintained assumption that the error covariances among pairs containing a common country m
are equal to a common value σm, the covariance matrix of the vector of residuals ε is of the form:
Ω = cov
⎛
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In this context, controlling for a common-country ﬁxed eﬀect should account for the correlated part
of the error term. For this we rely on well-known results cited in Case (1991), showing that ﬁxed
eﬀects soak up spatial correlation, though in a context quite diﬀerent from ours: we do not have
longitudinal data, and the panel nature of our dataset comes from the fact that each country is




γkδk + νij (45)
where δk =1if k = i or k = j, δk =0otherwise, and νij is a well-behaved disturbance term.
We treat δk as ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e. we introduce in the regression a set of N dummy variables δk
each taking on a value of one N −1 times.66 Given our estimator, the eﬀect of the right-hand side
65Note that simply treating εi and εj as ﬁxed eﬀects, by including corresponding dummy variables in the regression,
will not fully address our concern. This is because, with the exception of country 1 and country N, all countries will
appear either in position i or in position j in diﬀerent observations, inducing spatial correlation between these pairs.
In the example above, for instance, country 2 appears in position i in observation 1, and in position j in observation
4, inducing spatial dependence between ε12 and ε23.S i m p l ec o u n t r yﬁxed eﬀects would not soak up this dependence.
66The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects did not greatly alter the signs or magnitudes of the estimates of the slope coeﬃcients
51variables is identiﬁed oﬀ the variation within each country, across the countries with which it is
matched.
It is in principle possible to test for the presence of spatial correlation both in the model with
common country ﬁxed eﬀect and without. Such tests, known as Moran’s I-tests, require specifying a
neighborhood matrix along which non-zero correlations are allowed. In our case, the neighborhood
matrix is easy to conceptualize: its entries are 1 whenever there is a common country in a pair,
zero otherwise. Unfortunately, the dimensionality of the neighborhood matrix equals the square
of the number of observations. In the case of our worldwide dataset, there would be 192,127,321
entries, making the problem computationally in t r a c t a b l e . W eh a v er u nI - t e s t sf o ro u rs m a l l e r
dataset of European countries, where the matrix has 87,616 entries.67 Without dummies, Moran’s
I test suggested the presence of spatial correlation. With common country dummies added to the
speciﬁcation, it did not. We ﬁnd this to be encouraging.
To summarize, for each country we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country appears
in a given pair. We then include the full set of N dummy variables in the regression. The in-
clusion of these ﬁxed eﬀects soaks up the spatial correlation in the error term resulting from the
presence of each country multiple times in various country pairs. In addition, our standard errors
are heteroskedasticity-consistent (i.e. we correct standard errors to account for the fact that the
diagonal elements of Ω might diﬀer).68
on our variables of interest, compared to simple OLS estimation. In contrast, in line with our expectations, our
common-country ﬁxed eﬀects technique resulted in standard errors that were quite diﬀerent from (and generally
much larger than) the (wrong) ones obtained with simple OLS.
67The speciﬁcation being tested is the baseline speciﬁcation of Column 2 in Table 9. Details of these tests are
available upon request.
68There are obviously several ways to address the issue of spatial correlation in our context. An alternative we
considered would be to do feasible GLS by explicitly estimating the elements of Ω, and introducing the estimated Ω as a
weighing matrix in the second stage of the GLS procedure. While apparently straightforward, this is computationally
very demanding as the dimensionality of Ω is large - in our application we have over 13,000 country pairs with
available data on the variables of interest, and up to 167 covariance terms to estimate. We also pursued several
bootstrapping strategies based on selecting subsamples such that the problem of spatial correlation would not occur,
generating results very similar to those we present here. Details and results from these bootstraps are available upon
request. In contrast to these alternatives, our approach is computationally easy to implement.
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Table 1 - Income Level Regressions, World and Europe Samples 
Dependent variable: Log income per capita 1995 
 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 
  World sample  Europe sample 
 Univariate  Add  geographic 
distance 
Univariate Add  geographic 
distance 
Weighted Fst Genetic   -9.105 -8.874  
Distance (0.902)** (0.900)**  
Fst genetic distance in   -54.853  -38.915
Europe (16.835)**  (24.624)
Absolute difference in   1.872   1.472
latitudes (0.563)**   (5.088)
Absolute difference in   0.585   -0.909
longitudes (0.232)**   (0.862)
Geodesic Distance   -0.166   -0.071
(1000s of km)  (0.045)**   (0.412)
1 for contiguity  0.867   -0.137
 (0.183)**   (0.177)
=1 if either country is   0.494   -0.154
an island  (0.164)**   (0.195)
=1 if either country is   -0.415   -0.189
landlocked (0.191)**   (0.260)
=1 if pair shares at   -0.295   0.052
least one sea or ocean  (0.175)*   (0.219)
Constant 9.119 9.459 9.964  10.083
 (0.106)** (0.191)** (0.102)**  (0.315)**
Observations 162 162 25  25
Adjusted R-squared  0.35 0.47 0.33  0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
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